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Mobile agent technology presents an attractive alternative to the client-server paradigm 
for several network and real-time applications. However, for most applications, the lack 
of a viable agent security model has limited the adoption of the agent paradigm. This 
thesis presents a security model for mobile agents based on a security infrastructure for 
Computational Grids, and specifically, on X.509 Proxy Certificates. Proxy Certificates 
serve as credentials for Grid applications, and their primary purpose is temporary 
delegation of authority. Exploiting the similarity between Grid applications and mobile 
agent applications, this thesis motivates the use of Proxy Certificates as credentials for 
mobile agents. A new extension for Proxy Certificates is proposed in order to make them 
suited to mobile agent applications, and mechanisms are presented for agent-to-host 
authentication, restriction of agent privileges, and secure delegation of authority during 
spawning of new agents. Finally, the implementation of the proposed security 
mechanisms as modules within a multi-lingual and modular agent infrastructure, the 
Distributed Agent Delivery System, is discussed. 
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Most network applications currently employ the client-server model, where both
the client and server are static processes that communicate data over a network using
message passing or Remote Procedure Calls (RPC). Mobile agents present a paradigm
shift in the way we traditionally view network or distributed applications, in that code
travels over the network to where the data is, instead of vice versa as in the client-
server paradigm. The benefits of this approach include reduced bandwidth require-
ments in data filtering applications, reduced network latency in highly interactive
applications, server-side customization of software to add client-specific functionality,
and disconnected operation in mobile client computing [18]. Other application areas
for mobile agents include e-commerce, active networks [34], and deploying new soft-
ware autonomously. Mobile agents are also well suited to distributed applications by
virtue of their ability to clone themselves and designate a clone for each sub-task.
In addition, agents are being proposed as an increasingly attractive solution for real-
time applications such as routing and resource management in networks due to their
reduced network overhead and fault-tolerant properties [23].
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A mobile agent, in general, is a software entity (program) that acts on behalf
of another entity (individual, organization, etc.). It is autonomous (capable of deci-
sion making), goal-directed, and is capable of suspending execution on one platform,
moving to another platform, and resuming execution on the second platform. This
implies that an agent encapsulates both program code and state variables such as the
program counter, registers, stack, etc. Since an agent is nothing but a program, it
requires a platform that will execute its instructions. Depending upon the language
used to program the agent, it may be executed either as an independent process or in
the context of a language interpretor. In addition, during its lifetime, an agent may
perform various activities such as acquiring resources on a host, migrating from host
to host, communicating with other agents on local or remote hosts, creating clones,
or merging with other agents [23]. All these activities require the co-operation of
the host that the agent executes on. The underlying system on the host that makes
agent applications possible is known as the agent’s infrastructure. Thus, in addition
to providing an execution environment, the infrastructure must support all the func-
tionality required by an agent application. It is also desirable that an infrastructure
be able to support agents varying in their requirements for language, authentication,
fault-tolerance, etc. Many existing agent infrastructures restrict the agents that they
support to a single language and authentication mechanism, and by virtue of their
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design, to one class of applications. Further, they do not provide interoperability
between other agent infrastructures, which is one of the reasons the agent paradigm
is not prevalent in today’s network applications.
Another major concern with mobile agents is security. The security concerns
for mobile agent applications include and surpass those for traditional distributed
applications. This is due to the fact that mobile agents travel from host to host,
and in doing so may cross over boundaries that define trust domains. The tightest
boundaries are often drawn across the local host itself: processes started on the host
by one of its valid users are assumed to be “safe”, and allowed the same access rights
as the user. This assumption is no longer valid for mobile agent applications, since an
agent executing on a host may not have originated on that host. Trust domains could
be extended to cover an entire network such as a private Local Area Network (LAN),
but in order to support truly distributed applications, agents must be allowed to
cross these boundaries as well. Thus, there is a need to protect hosts from potentially
malicious agents. Similarly, an agent that originates on a host could assume that its
execution environment is safe, but before it begins execution on a remote host, it must
ensure that the latter is not malicious. Thus, security for agent-based computation is
an important issue, and in fact, the lack of a practical security model for agents has
further delayed the adoption of the agent paradigm in distributed applications. The
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following section examines the security issues related to agents and agent platforms
in a typical agent application.
Security Issues in Mobile Agent Applications
The introduction of code mobility in the mobile agent paradigm gives rise to a
number of issues related to host and agent security. Jansen et al. [21] classify security
threats into three main categories: disclosure of information, denial of service, and
corruption of information, and examine how they apply to an agent system. Farmer
et al. [6], in their paper, classify security goals for agent applications into what is
impossible, what is easy, and what is possible but not easy. Although a number
of different models for agent systems have been proposed [13], for the purpose of
this discussion it is sufficient to consider a simple model consisting of the agent and
the agent platform/host. An agent consists of a persistent code section that stores
instructions, and a data section that stores the agent’s state. The latter could further
be divided into static data that does not change over the lifetime of the agent, and
dynamic data that changes as a result of agent computation as it migrates from host
to host. Here, the agent code and static data together will be referred to as the agent’s
footprint. An agent originates at a host, referred to as its home platform, migrates to
remote hosts to perform its computation, and finally returns to the home platform
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with its results. As long as the agent remains on its home platform, it is assumed to
be safe from tampering or eavesdropping. This assumption no longer holds true when
the agent begins migrating from host to host. The itinerary of the agent may cause it
to cross the boundaries of the trust domain that it originated in. For instance, if the
agent originated on a host that was part of an internal network behind a firewall, we
could reasonably assume that it would be safe as long as it restricted its migration
to hosts that were protected by the firewall. This assumption, however, restricts
the flexibility and scalability of agent applications. Therefore, when developing a
security model for agents, the assumptions about trust must be kept to a minimum.
The security requirements for a mobile agent system could be examined under two
categories: security for the host and security for the agent. While host security aims
at prevention of tampering, agent security aims at detection of tampering. This is
because a host is a static entity whereas an agent is mobile. An agent executing on
a remote host is vulnerable to eavesdropping and corruption, since the host exercises
complete control over the agent and has unrestricted access to its code and data.
Consequently, it is easier for an agent to detect tampering, e.g., through the use of
cryptographic checksums, than to prevent it.
5
Host Security
A host provides resources and an execution environment for agents that request
its services. Since agents that do no originate on the host could be malicious, a host
must protect its environment and resources from tampering by such agents. Some of
the issues that must be considered here are agent authentication, agent authorization,
code integrity and correctness, and data integrity.
The agent authentication mechanism verifies the identity of the incoming agent,
which is merely the identity of the user on whose behalf the agent acts. If authenti-
cation was successful, the authorization process ensures that any resources requested
by the agent are permitted it as specified by the host’s security policy. Further, a
host must be capable of recognizing and enforcing additional restrictions placed on
the agent by its originator. Code integrity checking ensures that the agent code has
not been tampered with by malicious entities, while code correctness proofs establish
that the agent code executes under the constraints of the host’s security policies [27].
A mobile agent may become malicious if its state is corrupted, even if its code has not
been tampered with. Hence, a host may verify the integrity of an incoming agent’s
state using techniques such as state appraisal functions [7].
All of the above mentioned security measures could be applied by the host before
accepting an agent for execution. If the agent fails any of these checks, it may be
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denied access to the host’s environment. Thus, host security measures are generally
pro-active.
Agent Security
Depending upon its application and the sensitivity of data generated, an agent
may need to protect its code and data from eavesdropping not only while in transit
but also from the hosts it executes on. Some issues related to agent security are
host authentication, confidentiality and integrity of agent code and data, integrity of
dynamically generated agent data, and secure delegation.
The purpose of host authentication is to ensure that the remote host chosen for
migration by an agent is sufficiently trusted to provide it a secure execution environ-
ment. A simple way to establish the set of trusted hosts is to store it as static data
inside the agent, and authenticate a remote host using certificate-based authentication
mechanisms such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [12]. Upon successful authentication,
the agent may need to migrate to the remote host over open and insecure network
connections. Hence, it is important to keep the contents of the agent confidential to
prevent eavesdropping over the network. Further, some measures must be employed
to ensure integrity of the agent (detect tampering of its code and data) as it tra-
verses the network. Confidentiality could be achieved by encrypting the agent before
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transmitting it over the network, while integrity could be achieved through the use
of cryptographic hash functions.
Besides hiding its contents from network eavesdroppers, an agent may sometimes
wish to hide the functionality of its code from the host it executes on, for instance,
when the agent uses a proprietary algorithm to predict stock rates. In order to ensure
code privacy, Sander et al. [30] have proposed computing with encrypted functions
and generating encrypted results that are later decrypted by the agent’s originator.
A weaker form of code privacy is provided by obfuscating agent code [19]. During
the course of its execution, the agent may generate data that must be protected
from corruption by potentially malicious hosts that it might visit in future. Partial
Result Authentication Codes (PRACs) allow an agent to encapsulate intermediate
information such that it preserves a property known as forward integrity [36].
One of the most important properties of an agent is its ability to clone itself when
required. This implies that it must delegate or transfer its authority to its clone. The
clone in turn must have the capacity to delegate authority to any agents it creates.
The transfer of authority must be done securely such that it is difficult for a malicious




The following discussion presents an example derived from a paper by Dunne [5]
to illustrate a typical application area of mobile agents, namely, resource discovery in
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Figure 1.1: Mobile Agents for Resource Discovery
Consider the example network divided into several administrative domains, each
with its own usage and security policies, and managed independently of others. As
illustrated in figure 1.1, the network administrator (NA) of each domain injects a
discovery agent (DA) into the network. The DA’s function is to determine resource
availability within the NA’s domain, hence its itinerary is limited to those nodes
that belong to the NA’s administrative domain. The DA divides its domain into
several sub-domains based on the network topology, clones itself, and designates a
clone for each of these sub-domains. The clone’s itinerary is limited to the nodes
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that belong to its designated sub-domain. The clones subdivide their domains and
this process continues till the domains are small enough that no further cloning is
required. Whenever a DA visits a node, it updates itself with resource information
on that node, and updates the node with resource information about other nodes it
has previously visited. If two sibling agents (agents having the same parent) happen
to arrive at the same node, the agent that arrived later destroys itself. The clones
propagate resource information to their respective parents until complete resource
information about the entire domain ultimately reaches the original DA.
The above example presents several scenarios where authentication, authorization,
and delegation would be required. In general, an agent created by an entity acts on
behalf of that entity. Thus, the DA acts on behalf of the NA. From a security
standpoint, the following issues are identified:
. The discovery agents must be able to prove to a verifying host that they act on
behalf of the NA. In other words, a DA must authenticate itself to each node
it visits.
. The DA must be able to securely delegate its authority to any clones it creates.
. The NA must have some means of restricting the DA’s authority to accessing
specific files on specific hosts.
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In later chapters, as mobile agent security issues are addressed, this example will
be revisited to illustrate how security objectives for mobile agent applications could
be achieved.
Scope of the Thesis
This thesis presents a security model for mobile agents that primarily focuses on
the following issues:
  Authentication: A mechanism to authenticate an agent to remote hosts is
presented.
  Authorization: Means to limit the rights of an agent to exactly those that are
required by it to perform its task are discussed. The discussion also considers
how an agent could further limit the rights of agents that it spawns or clones.
  Delegation: Methods are proposed to securely delegate the originator’s au-
thority from the originator to an agent, and from one agent to another. The
delegation mechanism proposed could be used to not only propagate existing
restrictions to the agent receiving the delegation, but also introduce additional
restrictions on it.
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Mobile agent applications are generally distributed in nature, since agents roam
around a network and access resources on hosts distributed across administrative and
trust domains. Therefore, a security infrastructure for the mobile agent environment
must take into account both the distributed nature and mobility of the entities in-
volved. The security model proposed in this thesis borrows from the Grid Security
Infrastructure (GSI), a security infrastructure for large-scale distributed computing
environments, or Grids, as they are commonly known. In addition, this thesis ad-
dresses the implementation aspects of the model in the context of a specific agent in-
frastructure, the Distributed Agent Delivery System (DADS). The DADS was chosen
because it provides a flexible and modular interface that can support a heterogeneous
blend of agents and agent applications. Therefore, the proposed mechanisms for au-
thentication, authorization, and delegation could easily be incorporated as modules
within the DADS.
The material is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces Computational Grids
along with the security requirements of Grid applications. In particular, it focuses
on X.509 Proxy Certificates and their use in authentication and restricted delegation
for Grid applications. Finally, it presents the motivation for applying Grid security
solutions to mobile agents. Following that, Chapter 3 presents a security model for
mobile agents based on GSI, that focuses on authentication of agents, restriction
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of agent privileges, and secure delegation during spawning of new agents. Next,
Chapter 4 discusses the design of the DADS, its agents, and its component modules,
and explains how the proposed agent security mechanisms could be incorporated into
the DADS as modules. Chapter 5 presents a summary of the thesis along with a
discussion of future work.
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CHAPTER 2
SECURITY FOR GRID APPLICATIONS
Computational Grids [10] are high-performance distributed computing environ-
ments that provide pervasive access to computational resources through large-scale
resource sharing among multiple heterogeneous networks. Thus, Grids attempt to
provide computing power “on demand” to applications, much like the power grids of
today which supply electricity on demand to consumers. The user in effect pays for
using computational power but not for the cost of the computing equipment itself.
The result is enormous processing power that could be used for complex scientific
computation, modeling and visualization experiments, distributed data mining, and
other super-computing applications [9].
A Grid application differs from traditional distributed applications in several ways.
It is characterized by a large and dynamic user population that shares resources across
large heterogeneous networks. The resource pool itself is large and dynamic and may
include other hosts in the network, file and print servers, cluster computers, etc. Dur-
ing the course of its lifetime, a Grid application started by a user may acquire and
release resources dynamically on several machines. These resources would typically
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be situated in different geographic locations of the Grid and belong to different ad-
ministrative and trust domains. Hence, it is necessary for the user to be authenticated
by each of the required resources before accessing them. Due to the dynamic nature
of the resource pool and the need for applications to acquire resources continually,
it is not possible to establish trust relationships between the user and resources at
the start of the computation itself. Further, Grid applications are usually long-lived,
requiring several hours or even days to complete. Hence, it is desirable that the user
authenticate herself just once at the start of the computation, and have a user process
authenticate to resources on her behalf as and when required, without further inter-
vention from her. This property is known as single sign-on, and it implies the need
for a mechanism to delegate the user’s authority to processes acting on her behalf.
In addition to single sign-on, delegation is required in situations such as third-party
data transfers, where a user may wish to transfer data between two remote hosts,
say B and C. Instead of authenticating herself to B and reading data from B, then
authenticating herself to C and writing data to C, the user could delegate her author-
ity to both B and C, which could then mutually authenticate each other using the
delegated credential and directly transfer data.
In a Grid, users and resources, by virtue of being located in different administra-
tive domains, may employ different mechanisms for authentication and authorization
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depending upon the local domain’s security policies. These mechanisms could include
Kerberos1, Unix security, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Shell 2, etc. Moreover,
security policies on local sites are generally inflexible and vary widely in terms of cre-
dential requirements from one site to another. It is therefore impractical for a user to
employ different mechanisms to authenticate to different resources. What is required
is a global mechanism that provides inter-domain access to heterogeneous resources
while preserving site-specific security policies. Hence, a security infrastructure for
Grid applications must be able to inter-operate with local security mechanisms while
providing uniform authentication and authorization mechanisms to Grid users and
applications. The Globus Toolkit3 [8], developed under the Globus Project4 [15], pro-
vides core middleware services such as communication, information infrastructure,
data management, fault detection, and security, which are required to support Grid
applications. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [11, 17], which is the security
component of the Globus Toolkit, was developed to address the security issues typical
of Grid applications. GSI uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and X.509 certificates
to provide SSL-based authentication, confidentiality, and message integrity for Grid
applications. It also provides multi-site authentication while allowing each site to
1   Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts.
2  SSH Communications Security, Corporation Finland.
3   University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
4   University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
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define its own security policy and authentication mechanisms. Thus, we could have
different sites participating in a Grid application using GSI for inter-site authentica-
tion, while continuing to use site-specific mechanisms such as Kerberos, Unix security,
etc. for intra-site authentication. Finally, GSI uses Proxy Certificates to achieve the
essential requirements of single sign-on and delegation for Grid applications. Over
the years, GSI has proved to be one of the most successful approaches to providing
Grid security. It has been deployed not only in Grid environments, but also in dozens
of supercomputers and storage systems, thus achieving a level of acceptance reached
by few other security infrastructures [3].
Proxy Certificates
GSI addresses the issues of single sign-on and delegation through the use of X.509
Proxy Certificates, the specification for which is outlined in [32]. A proxy, as the
term implies, stands temporarily in place of the original. An X.509 Proxy Certificate
(PC) is a temporary credential that allows its owner to represent another entity for a
limited time period. The entity that the PC owner stands in for could be either (1)
an end-entity such as a user or service that possesses a valid X.509 certificate issued
by a Certificate Authority (CA), or (2) an entity such as a process that possesses
a valid Proxy Certificate. The user or process that signs a PC is referred to as the
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Proxy Issuer (PI). Like all X.509 certificates, a PC has its own distinct public and
private key pair. It can sign other PCs, but not any other end-entity certificates.
A PC is derived from its PI’s X.509 certificate, and its format is illustrated in



































Figure 2.1: Proxy Certificate Format
. The Serial Number field is unique amongst all PCs issued by its PI.
. The Issuer field is the same as the Subject field of its PI.
. The Validity period is typically shorter than that of its PI, and is specified at
the discretion of the PI.
. The Subject field is its issuer name (or the subject name of its PI) concatenated
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with a component that is unique amongst all PCs issued by its PI. This ensures
that each PC has a unique identity.
. The public key in SubjectPublicKeyInfo is a part of a newly generated key
pair, the private key of which belongs to the PC owner.
. If the extensions keyUsage and extKeyUsage are present in the PI’s certificate,
they are present in the PC as well, and may restrict its key usage further.
. The Basic Constraints extension is present and is set to false to indicate that
the PC cannot act as a CA.
In addition, every PC contains a new extension called ProxyCertInfo that iden-












 Decrypt pvt key
verify request
      sign PC
  create cert. request
  Generate key pair
Figure 2.2: Delegation of authority from entity A to entity B
19
The purpose of creating a PC is to delegate authority from one entity to another.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the delegation of authority from entity A to entity B located
on different machines in a network. First, A and B mutually authenticate each other
with their respective X.509 credentials using SSL and establish an authenticated,
integrity-checked channel for communication. Next, B generates a key pair, uses it to
create a Proxy Certificate request, and transmits it to A over the channel. Finally,
A verifies that the certificate request conforms to the PC profile, optionally places
restrictions inside the PC, signs it with its private key, and returns it to B. As a
result, B becomes the owner of a proxy credential that represents A.
Authentication
The owner of a proxy credential could use GSI authentication to establish its
identity to a verifier. As illustrated in figure 2.3, a PC owner authenticating itself
to a verifier using GSI must present to the verifier its entire certificate chain starting
from the CA certificate (or the end-entity certificate) to the last PC. The latter could
then apply a path validation algorithm similar to the one employed for X.509 certifi-
cates [20], the differences to which are outlined in the Proxy Certificate draft [32].
The purpose of path validation is to verify the binding between the PC subject name
and public key. Among others, the verifier must ensure that the certificate chain has
20
a valid depth, and that each certificate in the chain is valid at the current time. Addi-
tionally, for each certificate i in the chain, the issuer name of i must equal the subject
name of i − 1, and further, certificate i must be signed by certificate i − 1. Once the
chain is verified, the verifier could issue a challenge using procedures outlined in the
SSL protocol [12] to establish that the authenticating entity was indeed the owner of















Figure 2.3: GSI authentication using X.509 Proxy Certificates
GSI provides cross-domain authentication through the use of global and local
credentials, and a mapping between the two. Specifically, each user requires a Globus
credential, which is an X.509 credential issued by a Globus CA, and accounts on each
site that the user wishes to access resources on. Each site has a Globus gatekeeper,
a trusted daemon that authenticates users using GSI. In order to access resources on
a local site, the user first authenticates herself to the gatekeeper at that site using
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her Globus credential. Upon successful authentication, the user’s Globus identity is
mapped to a corresponding local identity, such as a Unix user id, that is recognized by
the site’s security mechanisms, and used for authorization decisions when accessing
the site’s resources. In addition, the delegation of authority from a user/process A to
another process B is mediated through the gatekeeper at process B’s site. Thus, the
Globus credential is used for single sign-on and delegation, while the local credential
is used to enforce site-specific security policies.
Restricted Delegation
An entity that owns a Proxy Certificate could sign additional PCs and delegate
its authority as many times as desired: thus user U could delegate her authority to
process P, which in turn could delegate its authority to process Q, and so on. In
this manner, a chain of authority could be established starting at the end-entity and
ending at the entity that was delegated a proxy credential. At each level of delegation,
the credential consists of the end-entity certificate and a set of Proxy Certificates. The
entity at each level could associate restrictions with the Proxy Certificate that it signs,
to indicate the set of operations that the credential owner at the next level is allowed
to perform. Thus, PCs could be used for restricted delegation of rights.
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Every Proxy Certificate contains an extension called ProxyCertInfo that identi-
fies the certificate as a PC, and defines any restrictions that the PI may have placed
on its use. This extension is also required to ensure proper path validation of a Proxy
Certificate chain. Through the pCPathLenConstraint field inside this extension, the
PI could specify the depth of the certificate chain that the PC owner may sign, and
thus limit subsequent delegation of the PC. A depth of 0 indicates that the PC cannot
sign any other PCs. The PI could also specify restrictions on the PC’s use through the
proxyPolicy field inside the extension. The purpose of placing policy restrictions in-
side a PC is to limit the amount of authority delegated to it. The set of rights granted
a PC owner is then the intersection of the set of rights in each certificate along the
certificate chain leading to the PC. Therefore, when making authorization decisions
for the PC owner, a verifier must take into account not only the local host’s security
policies, but also the restrictions placed inside the PC. The presence of policies inside
PCs places the burden of authorization decisions on the verifier, since it is expected
to understand the policy language of the restrictions, and is the only entity that can
enforce the restrictions specified in the PC.
The end-entity’s private key is usually stored in encrypted form on her local ma-
chine. In the absence of PCs, single sign-on could be achieved by having a local
process authenticate to resources on the user’s behalf, but this would require the
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user’s private key to be stored in decrypted form somewhere in memory so that the
process could access it, and thus increase the risk of it being compromised. The use
of Proxy Certificates for single sign-on minimizes exposure of the user’s private key,
since it needs to be decrypted just once, at the time the PC is being created. Be-
yond this, single sign-on and further delegation do not require access to the user’s
private key. The PC’s private key is now stored unencrypted on the machine, but its
compromise does not have as harmful consequences as compromise of an end-entity’s
key for the following reasons. First, the user certificate is usually long-term, and if
compromised, hard to replace. In contrast, a PC has a much shorter validity period
and could be easily created by the user without requiring interaction with any third
party such as a CA. Second, the authority of a PC could be limited by specifying
restrictions on its use through the ProxyCertInfo extension. The same extension
could also be used to limit the depth of the certificate chain created by a PC. Finally,
the keyUsage extension could be placed inside a PC to restrict the usage of its private
key.
The concept of a proxy credential is not unique to GSI. In a paper by Neuman [28],
proxy credentials have been proposed for authorization and accounting in distributed
systems. Kerberos [24] also employs the concept of a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT),
a temporary user credential that could be used for single sign-on, and forwardable
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tickets that could be used for delegation. However, the creation of a Kerberos TGT
involves a trusted third party, the Domain Controller. In contrast, a PC can be
created by the end-entity without requiring interaction with any trusted third party.
Further, in order to be useful for inter-domain authentication, Kerberos must also be
used as the intra-domain authentication mechanism, a condition that is not feasible
for Grid applications [3].
The GSI is implemented on top of the Generic Security Services Application Pro-
gramming Interface (GSS-API) [35] to provide a generic interface for authentication
and authorization mechanisms. Currently, GSI uses SSL libraries to provide X.509
certificate-based security services for Grid applications. Implementations of the GSS-
API using Kerberos have also been provided.
Grid Computing and Mobile Agents
The distributed nature of Grid applications very closely resembles that of mobile
agent applications. Thus, both are similar in many respects as outlined below:
• Both applications are characterized by heterogeneity of participating sites with
varying trust levels between constituent sites. Hence, establishment of trust
between two entities may need to cross administrative boundaries.
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• A mobile agent could be equated to a long-lived process on a Grid, and similar
to a Grid process, is characterized by reduced interaction with the user that
created it.
• Both agents and processes on a Grid must have the power to act on behalf of
the user that created them. Further, they must have the ability to delegate
their authority to other processes or agents.
• In a Grid, the user and resource population is dynamic. Similarly, mobile agents
(which can treated as both user and resource) have a dynamic population.
• Similar to applications on a Grid, mobile agents may acquire resources, create
other agents, and release resources dynamically.
• Both Grid environments and mobile agent environments are designed to be
scalable and capable of large-scale deployment of resources.
Due to the similarity in Grid environments and mobile agent environments, it is
reasonable to conclude that the security infrastructure for Grids could be translated
to the mobile agent environment. Special attention, however, must be paid to the
factors that make the latter different, namely, mobility of the entities involved. The
following chapter outlines mechanisms using Proxy Certificates that address several
important security issues in the mobile agent environment.
26
CHAPTER 3
MOBILE AGENT SECURITY USING PROXY CERTIFICATES
A typical mobile agent application – such as the one illustrated in Chapter 1 –
requires several agent-host and agent-agent interactions that may take place over a
hostile communication channel between entities from different trust domains. Hence,
it is necessary to secure both agents and hosts by providing basic authentication and
authorization mechanisms that could be used for these interactions.
For most systems, decisions about resource access - namely, who might access a
resource and to what extent - are based on the identity of the principal making the
request. This requires that the principal possess a credential and some secret known
only to the principal that could be used to identify it to the resource. Examples
of such credentials are a login/password pair for password-based authentication, a
Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) for Kerberos, an X.509 certificate and a private key
for Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) authentication, etc. Similarly, a mobile agent must
possess a credential that allows it access to resources on remote hosts. Further, the
agent must delegate this credential to any new agents that it creates. A mobile agent
does not have an identity of its own, but acts on behalf of another entity. Therefore, at
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all times, the credential must identify the principal that the mobile agent represents.
In a typical agent application, the entity that an agent acts on behalf of could
be any one of the agent’s creator, originator, or home platform. The creator is the
entity that “manufactures” the agent, including its code, static data if required, and
proof of correctness functions. For instance, the creator could be a software firm
specializing in producing agent applications. The originator is the entity that injects
an agent into the network. Typically, the originator (or the organization she belongs
to) would purchase a mobile agent application from a creator and deploy it in their
network. The agent’s home platform is the host it originated on and is considered the
most secure and trusted environment for agent execution. Each of these entities must
have means of uniquely identifying themselves, such as an X.509 certificate issued by
a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). Of these three entities, the host, however, is
inanimate and hence cannot be held responsible for the actions of the agent. In many
cases, the creator too cannot be held responsible for the actions of the agent, but
can at best vouch for the correctness of the agent. Any harm caused by the agent
(due to it becoming malicious, for example) is ultimately the responsibility of the
entity that chooses to deploy it. Therefore, it is the originator that is responsible for
the agent and its actions, and hence for the purpose of this discussion it is assumed
that the agent acts on behalf of its originator. Viewing the agent in this manner has
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some other advantages: the originator could customize the agent – e.g., change code
parameters – before deploying it in an agent system. Further, in routing and resource
management applications, the originator would typically be the network administrator
of a local network where the agent is deployed, and is likely to have higher privileges
than the creator. Hence, agents carrying their originator’s credentials would have
higher privileges than those carrying their creator’s credentials, and could be used
to perform privileged operations on the hosts they visit, such as updating the host’s
routing table.
For the following discussion, it is assumed that the agent’s originator, as well as
every host in the network that the agent is likely to visit, possesses a valid X.509
certificate issued by a trusted CA. This thesis proposes the use of X.509 Proxy Cer-
tificates (PCs) as credentials for mobile agents. A PC would allow its owner, the
agent, to identity itself as representing its originator for authentication purposes, and
at the same time facilitate the creation of new PCs for any clones that it might create.
Additionally, through the values stored in its fields, a PC could be used to realize
various other desirable security features in the mobile agent environment:
1. A mobile agent is created and deployed in a network for a specific purpose that
lasts a finite amount of time, typically several hours. Hence, it is desirable to
limit the lifetime of the agent to exactly the period of time required for its task.
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This limits the damage caused by a stolen credential to the time for which it is
valid. The lifetime of a PC could be specified through its Validity field that
lists the start and end time during which it is valid. The validity period of a
certificate chain is the intersection of the validity period of individual certificate
inside the chain.
2. The subject field contains the identity of the agent, which is a concatenation of
its issuer name and a unique field, thus making the agent uniquely identifiable.
This is useful in situations such as logging an agent’s activities on a host. Also,
the agent’s identity along with associated timestamp information could be used
to leave trace information on a host, so that agents visiting the same host in
future could be made aware of the last visitation time of an agent on the host,
and clone or merge as required. The agent’s identity could also be used to
enforce policy restrictions on it. For instance, the originator may create an
agent and propagate its identity, along with restrictions on resource access that
apply to the identity, to other hosts in the network. In addition, a unique
identity makes it possible to specify the agent’s PC in a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL). An agent itself could use another agent’s identity as the basis for
establishing agent-agent communication.
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3. The keyUsage extension could be used to limit the usage of the PC’s key.
For instance, if the Proxy Issuer (PI) wished to restrict usage of the PC to
authentication alone, a corresponding value for this field may be assigned.
4. The pCPathLenConstraint field inside the ProxyCertInfo extension allows an
agent’s originator to restrict the depth of the descendent tree rooted at the
agent. The agent itself may use this field to restrict the level of delegation
that its child agent may perform. Thus, if the originator creates an agent with
a pCPathLenConstraint of 1, that agent could create clones, but the clones
themselves would not be able to create other agents. The path validation algo-
rithm for PCs must ensure that the depth of the certificate chain is consistent
with the value of the pCPathlenConstraint field for each certificate in the
chain.
5. The ProxyPolicy field inside the ProxyCertInfo extension contains restrictions
on the PC owner’s authority, and could be used by a host in conjunction with its
own security policy to determine the privileges that the PC owner (the agent)
is allowed. The absence of this field indicates an unrestricted proxy, implying
that the proxy owner has the same rights as the Proxy Issuer. This field is
discussed in later sections.
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In addition to the above-mentioned fields, a new private extension for Proxy Cer-










The AgentInfo field is created by the PI with the co-operation of the host on
which delegation takes place. The following fields are defined:
agentHash contains a cryptographic hash of the agent’s footprint(i.e. code and static
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data). It serves as a binding between the PC owner (the agent) and the PC
itself. This field is verified by a host during the authentication process.
delegateInfo contains the hostSignature field, which is a signature using the pri-
vate key of the host on which delegation took place. The signature is computed
over the host id, the time at which delegation took place, and a cryptographic
hash of the agent’s footprint, and may be verified using the host’s public key
stored in hostCertificate. The delegateInfo field could be used by other
hosts to verify the identities of the hosts through which the agent was dele-
gated, and to ensure that delegation took place on trusted hosts only. This
field is similar to the delegationTrace extension proposed in an earlier version
of the X.509 Proxy Certificate draft [33].
The AgentInfo extension is not critical, but applications that rely on this ex-
tension to make authentication decisions for agents may reject an agent whose PC
does not contain this extension. The use of this extension for authentication and
delegation is detailed in further sections.
The security issues in a mobile agent application arise as a result of various inter-
actions between agents and hosts, starting from the time an agent is created to the
time it returns to its home platform. At the time of agent creation, the originator
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must temporarily delegate her credential to the mobile agent and specify restrictions
on it. During migration to a remote host, the agent must authenticate itself to the
remote host. When executing on the remote host, the latter must verify that each
resource requested by the agent is allowed it as per the host’s policies and the agent’s
restrictions. During the course of its execution, the agent may choose to clone it-
self, which requires that the clone be delegated the agent’s credential and optionally
acquire further restrictions on its authority. In the following sections, the resource dis-
covery example from Chapter 1 is revisited in order to explain how Proxy Certificates
could be used to secure these interactions.
Agent Creation
As illustrated in the example from Chapter 1, the network administrator (NA)
creates a discovery agent (DA) for the purpose of resource discovery. It is assumed
that the private key corresponding to the NA’s X.509 certificate is encrypted with
a pass-phrase and stored on her workstation H1 in a local directory accessible only
to the NA and processes started by her. In order to create the DA and grant it a
temporary credential to represent the NA, the NA generates a Proxy Certificate from
her X.509 certificate containing the following fields:
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. The subject is the NA’s Distinguished Name (DN) from her end-entity certifi-
cate, concatenated with a unique number.
. The validity period is set to the time for which the DA is expected to be
active, say 12 hours. At the end of this period, a new Proxy Certificate must
be generated if required.
. The delegation depth (pCPathLenConstraint) is left unspecified, allowing un-
limited delegation.
. The restrictions stored in proxyPolicy limit the DA’s authority to accessing
network and user-specific system files on the hosts in its domain.
. A hash of the DA is stored in agentHash, thus binding the DA to its PC.
. The NA engages in an exchange with the local host H1, that results in the cre-
ation of the delegateInfo field containing H1’s signature on its (H1’s) identity,
the current time, and a hash of the DA. This exchange is detailed in a later
section.
The NA supplies a password to decrypt her private key and signs the PC generated
above. The PC along with its unencrypted private key is stored on H1 in the NA’s
local directory. The NA then injects the DA on the host H1.
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Agent Migration
The function of the DA is to gather resource information about its domain. Thus,
the DA is required to migrate from host to host to perform its function. Before
migration to a remote host can occur, the DA must authenticate itself to the remote
host.
Agent-to-host Authentication
An unprotected mobile agent’s code and data are open to corruption by malicious
hosts or network eavesdroppers, hence a host that allows a remote agent access to
its environment must be presented proof of the agent’s identity and integrity. In the
mobile agents example, the DA represents the NA in all its actions, hence, the DA
must authenticate itself to a host as the NA. Furthermore, the DA must present proof
to the host that it has not been tampered with. The DA could authenticate itself to a
remote host using SSL. However, SSL cannot be used with standard X.509 certificates
in the agent-host authentication scenario, since this would require the agent to possess
the private key of its originator. Equipping the agent with this key is dangerous, since
it allows any malicious platform or network eavesdropper to extract the key from the
agent, thus invalidating the security of the originator’s private key. In fact, it is
almost impossible to store a key securely on an agent [6]. Certain methods such as
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encrypted functions [1, 4] could be used to protect the privacy of the originator’s key,
but the solutions proposed are only of theoretical interest because of their lack of
efficiency.
An agent cannot carry keys with it: however, it is still possible to prove that it
acts on its originator’s behalf. One way of doing this is to have the agent’s originator
apply a hash function on the agent, sign the hash with her private key, and include
the signed hash along with her certificate in the agent’s data area. A verifying host
would decrypt the signed hash using the public key of the originator, apply the same
hash function on the agent that the originator used, and compare the two hashes.
A match would establish that the originator did indeed sign the agent, hence it is
reasonable to conclude that the agent represents its originator. Further, it proves that
the agent has not been modified in any way inconsistent with its functionality and
thus establishes its integrity. An agent comprises code and data sections, of which the
footprint(code and static data) does not change over its lifetime, hence proving its
integrity is straightforward and follows from the discussion above. Proving integrity of
non-static data, however, is much harder, and is by itself an active research area [22].
This document does not concern itself with non-static data integrity issues.
The method described above establishes the agent’s authenticity as a consequence
of verifying its integrity. While this approach to authentication does not require the
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agent to carry the private key of its originator, it has some disadvantages:
1. The signed hash of the agent serves as its credential. Since the agent does
not possess keys, it does not have the power to generate new credentials on
its originator’s behalf. Hence, it cannot create new agents on-the-fly that dif-
fer from the original either in code (different functionality) or data (restricted
functionality). This greatly reduces the power and autonomy of the agent.
2. When an agent clones itself, the clones inherit the signed hash from their par-
ent. Since the agent and all its clones possess the same digest, it is impossible
to securely distinguish an agent from its clones. A unique agent identifier is
necessary for activities such as communicating with other agents, merging of
agents, etc.
Agent authentication using Proxy Certificates can overcome the shortcomings of
the authentication mechanism outlined above. Authentication using PCs is a two-
step procedure: first, the agent proves knowledge of its PC’s private key to a remote
host. Second, it transmits itself to the remote host so that the latter may verify
the binding between the agent and its PC. As an example, consider the interaction















































Figure 3.1: Agent-to-host Authentication
1. The DA with its proxy credential and H2 with its X.509 credential use the
Grid Security Infrastructure’s certificate exchange and challenge-response phase
to authenticate each other (Chapter 2). During this step, H2 performs path
validation on the DA’s certificate chain consisting of the NA’s certificate and
the DA’s PC. Further, the DA and H2 establish a session key to create a secure
communication channel between them.
2. The DA clones itself and transmits the clone over the channel to H2. H2 com-
putes a hash over the clone and verifies that it matches the agentHash field
inside the DA’s PC. If it does, the DA stands authenticated and H2 sends a
positive response to the DA, otherwise it sends a negative response and termi-
nates the connection.
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3. Upon receipt of a positive response, the DA uses the session key established
during step 1 to encrypt its credential, including its certificate chain and private
key. It then transfers the same to H2, where it is stored in a directory accessible
to the DA’s identity alone.
4. The DA has now essentially migrated to H2. It therefore destroys its proxy
credential on H1, and then terminates itself. The clone on H2, being an exact
copy of the agent on H1 and possessing the DA’s credential, could function as
the original DA and resume execution on H2.
The above procedure (steps 1–4) is repeated each time the DA migrates to a new
host. Additionally, during step 1, the host could verify the delegateInfo field for
each PC in the agent’s certificate chain, as explained in the next section. During
agent migration, the agent’s credentials are transferred from one host to another over
an encrypted channel, and hence are safe from network eavesdroppers. However,
the remote host that the agent migrates to has complete knowledge of the agent’s
credential. Thus, there is always the possibility that it may misuse the credential and
create malicious agents impersonating the original. In the example, assume that host
H2 is malicious. Since H2 has access to the DA’s proxy credential, it could create a
malicious discovery agent DA2 possessing the same credentials and hence the same
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set of rights as the original DA, and use it to propagate false resource information in
the network. The agentHash field, by dint of containing a cryptographic hash of the
legitimate DA, guards against this possibility. Therefore, a malicious agent such as
DA2 is prevented from impersonating the DA since the former would fail step 2 of
the authentication process outlined above. Thus, the presence of the agentHash field
ensures that no entity apart from the agent that owns the PC could be authenticated
using the PC. In addition to authentication, the DA’s integrity is established during
step 2.
Agent execution on Remote hosts
Once an agent such as the DA in the agents example migrates to a remote host
such as H2, it begins execution on the host. During the course of its execution, the
agent may require access to the host’s resources such as its file system, operating
system services, etc., which requires that the host authorize these resource requests.
Further, the agent may create new agents or clone itself, which requires a delegation
of authority from the agent to its child agent.
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Agent Authorization
Authorization is the process of ensuring that the agent performs only those oper-
ations that it is permitted. This requires that the host have knowledge of the actual
set of operations the agent is allowed, and verify each resource requested by the agent
against this set. The simplest method of performing these checks is to grant the
agent the same set of rights as its originator, and leave the task of authorization to
the operating system. For example, assume that the NA has a local account on each
of the machines in the domain of the DA, and that when the DA travels to H2, it
queries the routing table of H2. The DA would be granted access to H2’s routing
table only if the NA herself had access to it. This check could be performed by the
operating system on H2 using the security policies pertaining to local user accounts.
The disadvantage with this approach is that an agent created by an originator, by
dint of acting on its originator’s behalf, may have more rights than the latter intended
it to have. Granting an agent more power than is strictly required to complete its task
is dangerous, especially since agents and their credentials are prone to compromise
by malicious entities. For instance, assume that the NA had root privileges on all
hosts in the DA’s domain. In the absence of restrictions, the DA would automatically
have root privileges on each host it visited, even though all it may require is access
to certain system files. If the DA became malicious, it could use its root privileges to
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compromise every host in its domain. The amount of damage could be contained by
limiting the validity period of the agent’s proxy credential, but it would be desirable
to have a means of limiting the rights of the agent itself.
One way to achieve this is for the originator to associate a set of rights with an
agent at the time of its creation, and store it as static data inside the agent. When
an agent visits a host and requests resources, the host must consider the restrictions
stored within the agent, in addition to its own local policy, in order to make an
authorization decision for the agent. This approach permits the originator to create
agents with varying rights to perform varying tasks, and serves to further limit the
damage caused by malicious agents. However, once an agent has been created, all its
descendents would have the same rights as the original agent. Since the original rights
are included in the agent’s static data, they cannot be altered without destroying the
agent’s integrity. It would be desirable, however, for an agent to have some means
of restricting the rights of its clones and of other agents it might create dynamically.
Proxy Certificates can be used for this purpose.
A PC generally inherits the rights of its PI. However, the PI could specify restric-
tions on the PC through its proxyPolicy field. The restrictions must be encoded in
a policy language that is understood by the both the entity that specifies (i.e., the
NA) and verifies (i.e., host H2) the restrictions. For example, assume that the NA
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has read, write, and execute permissions on a file F1 on host H2, and wishes to grant
the DA read and execute permissions for the same. The restriction for the required
right could be of the form DENY F1@H2 WRITE, meaning that write permission on F1
is denied the agent. Similarly, the DA could create another agent DA1 and grant it
read-only access to F1 by specifying a restriction of the form DENY F1@H2 EXECUTE
inside DA1’s PC.
The policies stored in a PC are extracted by the remote host to make authorization
decisions. For each resource requested by an agent, the host must verify that the
request satisfies the following two conditions:
–c1– Is the agent’s identity (i.e. its originator) allowed the operation as specified by
the operating system’s security policies?
–c2– Has the agent’s PI allowed the agent the operation, based on the restrictions
inside the agent’s PC?
In addition, if the agent’s PI is itself a PC, it too must satisfy the conditions listed
above. In other words, the rights associated with a PC are the intersection of the set
of rights specified in every PC along the PC owner’s certificate chain. These rights,
in conjunction with the host’s local security policies, determine the final set of rights
that the agent possesses. When the agent clones itself or creates a new agent, it could
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further limit the authority of the newly created agent by including policies inside the
latter’s proxy credential as well. Thus, with each level of delegation, the authority
of the agent could be further restricted if required. An agent cannot delegate more
authority than it possesses, but even if it does specify additional rights that it does
not possess, the verifying host ensures through the process described above that these
rights are disregarded while making authorization decisions.
Delegation
Credential delegation is the process by which an entity transfers its identity to
another. The DA in the agents example creates several child discovery agents, which
in turn create new agents as required. Each new agent created must have the capacity
to authenticate itself as the NA. However, it is desirable that each agent be uniquely
identifiable, and further, that the parent agent be able to associate a subset of its
rights with the child’s identity. An entity such as the DA possessing a PC could
delegate its authority to another entity such as its clone DA1 through the credential
delegation process outlined in Chapter 2. This provides the clone with its own PC
that uniquely identifies it, and that contains restrictions placed on its authority by
its parent.
Although credential delegation is a powerful tool, it could be misused by malicious
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entities. Suppose that the DA, upon migrating to host H2, creates a clone DA1 and
delegates its authority to DA1. This scenario could not be distinguished from one
where the host H2 was malicious, created a malicious discovery agent DA2, and used
the DA’s PC along with its private key to create a new credential for DA2. This
is because the process of delegation involves a signature by the entity, i.e. the DA,
that owns the proxy credential. When a mobile agent performs delegation on a
remote host, the private key of its credential is known to that host as well. Thus, the
host could easily impersonate the DA and create malicious agents without the DA’s
knowledge.
In order to make delegation more secure, the concept of trusted hosts for delegation
is introduced. A trusted host is one that is known to be “safe” for agent execution
and is known to not be compromised. In a network of several hundred hosts, a few
tens of hosts such as firewalls, routers, etc., could be deemed trusted. The set of
trusted hosts could be stored as system-wide data accessible to every entity in the
network, or could simply be established at the discretion of a verifying host. In order
to ensure secure delegation, the following condition is imposed upon the mobile agent
environment:
A mobile agent may delegate its authority to other entities on trusted
hosts only.
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The delegateInfo field inside a PC supports enforcement of the above rule. At
the time of delegation, the following interaction takes place between the mobile agent
and its host:
1. The agent conveys to its host a hash of the agent that it wishes to delegate its
authority to. This step does not require any authentication checks since these
are done prior to agent execution. Once the agent begins execution on the host,
it is deemed trusted.
2. The host verifies that the agent’s PC (obtained during the authentication phase)
. contains a valid (> 0) value for pCPathLenConstraint,
. has the ability to sign other PCs as specified by the keyUsage extension if
present, and
. is valid at the current time.
3. The host then uses its private key to sign the host id, the current time, and
the agent hash from step 1. The signature, along with the host’s certificate, is
returned to the agent.
4. The agent generates a PC for the agent it wishes to create, includes the host
signature and certificate in the delegateInfo field, and signs the PC.
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Thus, in the example, if the DA creates a clone DA1 on host H2, the delegateInfo
field for DA1’s PC would contain H2’s certificate, along with H2’s signature on its
identity, time of creation of DA1, and DA1’s hash. When DA1 authenticates itself
to a remote host, the latter would verify the delegateInfo field inside each PC
belonging to DA1’s certificate chain as follows. First, the remote host decrypts the
hostSignature field using the public key stored inside hostCertificate. Next, it
verifies that:
. the host id in the decrypted signature matches that inside hostCertificate,
and further, that it is the identity of a trusted host.
. the hash inside the decrypted signature matches the agentHash field inside the
PC.
. the timestamp inside the decrypted signature is within the validity period of
the PC. This prevents any replay attacks by a malicious host.
The verification of the delegateInfo field is not necessary for the first-level PC,
since the first level of credential delegation from the originator to the mobile agent
created by her is always assumed to have taken place securely. This is because the mo-
bile agent’s PC is signed using the originator’s private key, which is stored encrypted
on the originator’s local host with a pass-phrase known only to her. Therefore, it
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is difficult for a malicious entity to steal the originator’s private key and create mo-
bile agents at the first level of credential delegation. Thus, the first-level PC can be
considered as secure as the originator’s X.509 credential.
The discussion assumes that the agent itself is not malicious, but this is a valid
assumption since malicious agents are likely to fail authentication and other integrity
checks before they could even begin execution. The proposed delegation mechanism
makes it much harder for malicious entities to impersonate a trusted host as long as
the trusted host itself is not compromised.
The security of the delegation mechanism is dependent on the security of the
trusted hosts themselves. If a trusted host is compromised, all the agents created on
that host are suspect, since they may have been created by a malicious entity on the
compromised host. The risk of compromise could be reduced by applying safeguards
such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc., to protect the trusted hosts, but
it is impossible to prevent all attacks. In such cases, additional safeguards such
as the validity period, restrictions, key usage, delegation depth, etc., that are built
into Proxy Certificates could further reduce the damage caused by a compromised
credential on a host. Further, if a host A is known to be compromised, all other hosts
in the network could refuse to accept agents that have been delegated through the
host A.
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In this chapter, various mechanisms that are essential to the secure operation
of mobile agent applications have been presented. Each of these mechanisms, when
implemented in the context of an agent infrastructure such as the Distributed Agent
Delivery System (DADS), could be used to provide basic security features for mobile
agent applications. The following chapter describes the operation of these security





The Distributed Agent Delivery System (DADS) is being developed as part of an
ongoing research project on mobile agents at the University of North Texas 1 (UNT).
The motivation for the DADS arises from the fact that mobile agents may differ in
their requirements of their corresponding agent platform, based on the application
that they are designed for. For instance, an e-commerce application may emphasize
on security, hence a mobile agent designed for e-commerce must be able to perform
authentication, encryption, etc. Similarly, data transfer applications may require that
agents compress data before transmitting it in order to make transfers more efficient.
The functionality required by an agent must be supported by its underlying infras-
tructure, and in addition, it is desirable that the infrastructure adapt to the varying
needs of agents and agent applications. The DADS is one such agent infrastruc-
ture that provides an extensible and customizable platform for agent applications.
It is influenced in its design by other agent infrastructures, namely AgentTcl [16],
TACOMA [25], and Mole [2].
1The description of the DADS that follows is based on Cliff Cozzolino’s master’s thesis at the
University of North Texas.
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The DADS is organized into a daemon process and a set of loadable modules,
which may be used to provide a variety of services such as language availability,
security, and fault tolerance. The DADS daemon performs the functions of listening
on a standard TCP port for incoming agents, and managing the set of loaded DADS
modules. A module is a child process started by the main DADS daemon, that
communicates with the daemon using interprocess communication mechanisms. It
receives input from the DADS, processes it, and writes the results back to the DADS.
Further, modules may be chained, such that a module’s output that is sent back to
the DADS serves as input for another module. Modules may be loaded through a
plug-in style interface, making them available to agents as and when required. The
DADS is capable of supporting multiple modules for a single service, such as multiple
language interpreters, multiple security mechanisms, etc., at the same time. Hence,
the DADS can support multi-lingual agents that are not restricted to a particular
design such as a specific security mechanism. In general, modules allow the DADS
to support heterogeneity in agents and agent applications without having to change
the underlying DADS core.
DADS agents, borrowing from TACOMA agents, act as containers for three dis-
tinct segments: a code segment that stores instructions, a data segment that stores
the agent’s state, and a properties segment that describes the agent’s code and data
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segments. While the code and data segments may contain arbitrary sequences of bits,
the properties segment has a restrictive format consisting of three distinct elements:
Property ID, Property Name, and Sub-properties, together referred to as a property
structure. The Property Id is a standardized number that refers to a particular ser-
vice such as language or security. The Property Name is a string that describes the
Property Id, and the Sub-property field is a list of property structures that further
describe the particular property. Every agent contains a root Agent property, which
in turn may contain sub-properties for each of Language, Security, etc. The Secu-
rity sub-property may contain a sub-property for Authentication, which in turn may
contain sub-properties for PKI, Kerberos, etc. Thus, the properties segment stores
the description of an agent in the form of a hierarchical tree called a property hierar-
chy. Similarly, the DADS on a host contains a property hierarchy rooted at the Host
property, that describes its modules and the services it offers. Loaded modules are
registered as subtrees in the host’s property hierarchy. For instance, an authentica-
tion module for Proxy Certificates may be registered in the subtree
Host → Authentication → PKI.
The presence of the property tree on agents and hosts is essential to the agent
migration process. Since the DADS is capable of supporting a broad range of func-
tionality for agents, it is likely that the DADS on different hosts will offer different
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services to agents. Hence, a migrating agent must ensure that the remote host it
migrates to can support its requirements. Similarly, the DADS on each host must
verify that an agent satisfies certain requirements such as security, before accepting
it for execution. The DADS facilitates this decision making process via the Trans-
fer Protocol (TP), which defines the exchange of property trees between a migrating
agent and the host it migrates to. The TP consists of three phases. Phase (1) occurs
when the agent connects to a remote DADS daemon and transmits to it a subset of
its property tree describing its requirements. If the DADS can support the agent’s
requirements, it enters phase (2) of the protocol, where the DADS transmits its re-
quirements to the agent. Finally, if the agent supports the DADS’s requirements, the
TP moves into phase (3), where the entire agent is transmitted to the remote host.
At this point, the DADS may invoke an authentication module if specified by the
agent or the DADS, to facilitate authentication between the two entities.
Thus, the DADS allows for the development of a customizable and modular agent
infrastructure that supports a variety of agent languages and security services. The
following section describes the implementation aspects of the proposed mechanisms
for agent authentication, authorization, and delegation, in the context of their in-
terface with the DADS. Further, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that
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facilitate the development of the proposed mechanisms are examined, and some per-
tinent issues regarding implementation of modules for each of the above mechanisms
are discussed.
Implementation Details
In order to realize the proposed agent security model, mechanisms are required to
create proxy credentials with restricted rights, authenticate agents using their proxy
credential, and perform authorization checks for agents based on their proxy creden-
tial. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) implementation, currently at version 2.2,
provides extended functionality to support all these requirements. It is available as
open source software, and hence can readily be adapted to the implementation of a
security model for mobile agents.
The process of agent creation involves a credential delegation step, during which
the originator delegates her X.509 credential to the mobile agent. The agent’s Proxy
Certificate (PC) along with its private key is then stored as a file on the local host.
The GSI implementation provides functionality to generate a proxy credential from
a user’s X.509 credential, and in addition, associate restrictions and other certificate
extensions with the delegated credential. This functionality could be used by an
agent’s originator to generate a PC containing an AgentInfo extension specific to
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each agent, and optional restrictions on the agent’s authority. The agent itself must
be able to access its credential on the local host for authenticating to remote hosts,
and for destroying the credential when migrating to a different host. This requires
that the originator store some information in the agent’s data section, so that the
agent may reference itself to determine the path to its credential. One possibility,
as illustrated in figure 4.1, is to store a hash of the agent’s identity (i.e. the subject
Distinguished Name in its PC) in its static data, and construct a path to the credential

















Figure 4.1: Generating a filename for a Proxy Credential
Agent-to-DADS Authentication
Once the agent is injected on the local host, it may be required to authenticate to a
remote host in order to migrate to it. As outlined in Chapter 3, agent authentication
is a two-step procedure: first, the agent proves knowledge of its private key, and then
the host verifies the binding between the agent and its Proxy Certificate. Therefore,
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the agent authentication mechanism is implemented as two modules within the DADS.
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Figure 4.2: Agent-DADS Authentication
1. The agent opens a connection to the remote DADS daemon and transmits to
it a part of its property tree containing its requirements for language, security,
etc.
2. The DADS replies with a message that contains its requirements, in this case
authentication, and subsequently invokes the two-step authentication module.
3. The authentication module uses GSI to establish the identity of the remote
agent (step 1). All communication with the remote agent is routed through the
DADS daemon.
4. The authentication module returns to the DADS an OK / NOT OK response
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to step 1 of authentication, which in turn transmits the response to the remote
agent.
5. If the agent receives a positive reply, it clones itself and transfers the clone to
the remote DADS.
6. The transferred clone is sent to the integrity checking module, which implements
step 2 of authentication. This module uses the agent’s credential obtained in
step 1 of the authentication phase to verify the agent’s integrity against its
certificate.
7. The module send an OK / NOT OK response to the DADS, which transmits
this to the remote agent waiting on the migration step.
8. If the remote agent receives an OK, it may terminate itself or migrate to another
host as desired. If it receives a NOT OK reply, it may select another host in its
itinerary to migrate to, or report the problem to its home platform.
In the above procedure, the exchange of property trees between the agent and the
remote DADS is defined by the Transfer Protocol (TP). However, the TP does not
concern itself with the specifics of the authentication mechanism, which is instead
defined by the authentication protocol. The two-step agent authentication procedure
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is merely an extension of GSI authentication, and as such, may be implemented using
GSI libraries.
Implementation using the GSS-API
The GSI provides an implementation of the Generic Security Services API (GSS-
API) [26, 35] using OpenSSL libraries. The GSS-API provides a generic interface
for security services to its callers. An application may use the GSS-API to avail of
security services such as authentication, message integrity, etc., without concerning
itself with details of the underlying security mechanism. This facilitates portability,
since applications may be written without a specific security mechanism such as
Kerberos, PKI, etc, in mind. In order to use the GSS-API, an application follows the
procedure outlined below:
1. The application may first acquire credentials that enables it to establish its
identity to authenticating peers.
2. It then initiates the establishment of a security context with its peer. This
is a multi-step exchange, during which the context initiator is authenticated
to the context acceptor. The initiator may optionally require the acceptor to
authenticate itself, and may allow delegation of its authority to the acceptor.
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3. Once the security context is established, per-message services may be invoked
by either party to encrypt and apply integrity checking on data transferred
between the two parties.
4. Upon completion of the session, the security context is deleted by the respective
applications.
Credential management routines
gss acquire cred Acquire a handle to pre-existing credentials
gss release cred Destroy an existing GSS-API credential
Security context routines
gss init sec context Initiate a security context with a peer
gss accept sec context Accept a security context initiated by a peer
gss delete sec context Destroy an existing security context
Per-message routines
gss get mic Generate a cryptographic MIC for a message
gss verify mic Verify a MIC against a message
gss wrap Attach a MIC to a message and optionally encrypt it
gss unwrap Optionally decrypt a message and verify its MIC
Table 4.1: Core GSS-API routines
Table 4.1 summarizes routines in the GSS-API that facilitate credential acqui-
sition, establishment of security contexts, and per-message security services. The
gss acquire cred routine provides a calling application a handle to a pre-existing
credential, based on the name of the principal whose credential is required. An
existing credential may be freed using the gss release cred routine. A context
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initiator (i.e. client) may invoke the gss init sec context routine to establish a
security context with a context acceptor (i.e. server). The gss init sec context
routine returns a token that is transmitted to the acceptor, and presented to the
gss accept sec context routine invoked by the acceptor. The resulting token is in
turn transmitted to the initiator. The context establishment routines are invoked in
a loop and the resulting tokens transmitted to the peer, until a security context is
established between the two. The context initiator may request peer authentication
and may delegate its credential to the acceptor by setting appropriate flags in the
parameter list of gss init sec context. Once a security context is established be-
tween the peers, the gss get mic routine may be invoked by either peer to generate
a cryptographic Message Integrity code (MIC) for a message. This routine returns
a token that may be transmitted to the peer along with the message, and may be
verified by the peer using the gss verify mic routine. Similarly, the gss wrap rou-
tine may be used to attach a MIC to a message and optionally encrypt the message.
The corresponding function, gss unwrap is used by a peer to convert a message pro-
cessed by gss wrap back to its original form. This involves optionally decrypting the
message, and verifying its MIC. Finally, the gss delete sec context routine may
be used to discard an existing GSS-API security context.
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In addition, extensions to the GSS-API have been proposed [31] in order to facil-
itate credential delegation at any time and not just at the time of context establish-
ment. The proposed extensions also allow the initiator of the delegation to associate
restrictions with the delegated credential. Support for these extensions has been
provided in the current release of the GSI (release 2.2).
A module designed for authenticating mobile agents may make use of the GSS-
API implementation provided by the GSI libraries. In particular, the module may
invoke routines to establish a security context with the remote agent. The agent in
turn may initiate a security context with the remote DADS and authenticate itself.
Further, the agent may encrypt its credential before transferring it to the DADS. The
transferred credential, including the agent’s certificate chain and private key, is stored
by the remote DADS on its local storage. The location at which the credential is to be
stored is inferred through a hash of the agent’s identity stored in its data section, as
explained earlier. The agent’s Proxy Certificate chain obtained during authentication




An authenticated agent is executed in its language environment through a lan-
guage module such as a Perl interpreter. Whenever the agent requests system re-
sources, the language module must hand-off the authorization decision to a module
designed for that purpose. Figure 4.3 illustrates the process of authorizing an agent’s












Figure 4.3: Agent Authorization
1. The language module transmits the agent’s request to the DADS. Based on the
agent’s credentials obtained in the authentication phase, the DADS invokes the
appropriate authorization module, and forwards the agent’s resource request to
it.
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2. Based on the agent’s identity and the restrictions inside its PC, the authoriza-
tion module returns an OK / NOT OK response to the DADS, which is then
transmitted to the language module.
3. Finally, the language module allows the agent’s request (if the response was
OK) or blocks it (if the response was NOT OK).
The agent authorization module may employ the Generic Authorization and Ac-
cess control API (GAA-API) [29] to facilitate authorization decisions on resource
access for agents. The GAA-API supports a variety of security mechanisms and
authorization models. A typical GAA application creates a control structure that
stores callback routines for policy evaluation, and a security context that contains
the current user’s credentials. Policy evaluator callbacks may be installed for any
type of resource and resource access, and are invoked by the GAA-API when the user
attempts to access the specified resource. Thus, the GAA-API provides a framework
for mechanism-independent authorization decisions on resource access. A referential
implementation of the GAA is available from [14].
An authorization module for agents may install a callback to evaluate a resource
requested by an agent against the set of restrictions specified in its PC. The restric-
tions in the agent’s PC may be extracted by the authorization module using functions
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defined in the GSS-API extension. These restrictions would then be passed to the
policy evaluator callback, along with the agent’s request, to determine if the agent
may be allowed access to the requested resource.
The authorization procedure requires modification of the agent’s language en-
vironment to make it “agent-enabled”, but at the same time simplifies matters by
placing the burden of authorization decisions on the authorization module. Thus, the
language environment may provide wrappers for system calls, which would simply
invoke the authorization module, and based on its response, either allow or deny the
agent access to the requested resource.
Delegation
Before an agent clones itself, it must create a new credential for the clone. The
PC creation process for agents involves a signature on delegation information by the
host that the agent executes on. Hence, before actually creating a clone, an agent
must interact with a delegation module designed for the purpose of signing the agent’s
delegation information using the host’s credentials. This implies that the delegation
module must have the authority to sign information on behalf of the host. Figure 4.4
illustrates the process of delegation of authority from an agent to its clone:
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requests the host’s signature on the same. The request is sent to the language
module and routed to the delegation module through the DADS.
2. The delegation module verifies the agent’s request based on its credentials ob-
tained during the authentication phase. If the request is valid, the module
returns a signature, using the host’s private key, on the agent hash, host iden-
tity, and the current time. Otherwise, it returns a NOT OK message.
3. The delegation module’s response is transmitted to the executing agent. If the
delegation module returns the host signature, the agent may optionally verify
the signature and create a new PC for the clone. Finally, it creates a new agent
by sending a “clone” request to its language module.
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The delegation module may employ functions defined in the extensions to the
GSS-API to generate a delegated credential for the mobile agent.
The modular design of the DADS makes it easy to add functionality to it such as
PC-based agent security. Since modules do not form a part of the DADS core, they
may be developed independently of the DADS, as long as their interface with the
DADS is well defined. Thus, the mechanisms for agent authentication, authorization,
and delegation, when implemented as DADS modules, customize it to support PC-




This thesis has proposed a security model for mobile agent applications that is based
on the Grid Security Infrastructure and X.509 Proxy Certificates . A Proxy Certificate
issued to an agent by its originator serves as the agent’s credential for authentica-
tion to remote hosts. The binding between an agent and its credential is maintained
through a cryptographic hash of the agent code and static data stored inside its cer-
tificate. Further, restrictions encoded inside the certificate serve as a basis for making
authorization decisions on resource access for agents. This allows the agent’s origina-
tor a flexible selection of privileges for an agent, suited to the nature of the agent’s
task. The language used for encoding restrictions must be uniformly interpreted by
both the issuer of the agent’s certificate and the host that enforces authorization deci-
sions based on certificate restrictions. Finally, credential delegation, when performed
on trusted hosts, allows an agent to clone itself by creating a new Proxy Certificate for
the clone and associating with it a subset of the parent agent’s rights. Since a Proxy
Certificate is nothing but a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) credential, the proposed
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mechanisms offer a scalable solution to achieving security in the mobile agent envi-
ronment. A proof-of-concept implementation of these mechanisms is proposed in the
context of a flexible and scalable agent infrastructure, the Distributed Agent Delivery
System (DADS), which is capable of supporting multiple agent languages and security
mechanisms though its modular interface. The security mechanisms are implemented
as modules within DADS, thus making them flexible and extensible. Thus, future
extensions to the agent security model could be easily incorporated within the DADS
framework.
The proposed authorization mechanism relies upon policy restrictions encoded
inside a Proxy Certificate to make authorization decisions. Although the grammar
and semantics for the policy language have not been discussed, it is obvious that
any such language must be rich enough to describe all resource types that might
be required for a computation and the corresponding operations on the resources.
Another desirable feature in the mobile agent security model is motivated by the
heterogeneous nature of resources accessed by agents and their differing security re-
quirements. Similar to the Grid, different resources may require different kinds of
authentication. The security model presented here could be made interoperable with
participating sites’ local security policies and mechanisms through the co-operation
of the DADS. In order to ensure uniform authentication across resources, the DADS
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at each participating site could provide functionality for mapping an agent’s proxy
credential to a local credential, similar to the gatekeeper in Globus. This places the
burden of managing multiple agent credentials on the DADS on each participating
host, thus making the agent more light-weight than if it had to maintain multiple
credentials for authenticating to multiple sites.
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